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On June 14, 2003, a Jordanian man named Ra'ed al-Banna landed
at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport after a long flight from
Amsterdam.' His paperwork was in perfect order: He held a legitimate
Jordanian passport, he had obtained a visa authorizing him to work in
the United States, and he had previously visited this country without
incident. Nevertheless, al-Banna was pulled aside for a little extra
scrutiny at the customs checkpoint. He'd been flagged by an
automated system that national security officials use to analyze the
huge troves of passenger reservation data that airlines must turn over
when flying to the United States.2 The officers who questioned him
found him evasive, so they refused him entry and put him on the next
flight home.
A year and a half later, a massive car bomb detonated in Hilla,
Iraq, killing 132 police recruits. At the time, it was the deadliest
suicide bombing Iraq had seen. "The driver was Ra'ed al-Banna. We
know that because when authorities found the steering wheel of his
car, his forearm was still chained to it."3 It's impossible to know
whether al-Banna would have carried out a similar attack in the
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1 See Stewart A. Baker & Nathan Alexander Sales, Homeland Security, Information Policy,
and the Transatlantic Alliance, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 277,
277-78 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., Carolina Academic Press 2010).
2 49 U.S.C. §§ 44909(c)(2), (3) (2012).
3 Baker & Sales, supra note 1, at 278.
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United States if he hadn't been turned away at the border. But we're
fortunate not to have found out.
The recently disclosed NSA surveillance programs involve a
different agency and different information. But they aim at the same
objective-harnessing the power of big data to detect nascent threats
before they can do harm-and raise the same vital questions about
how to balance the competing demands of national security on the one
hand and privacy and civil liberties on the other. This essay uses the
NSA programs as a vehicle for thinking more broadly about bulk data
collection. It begins by addressing the potential benefits of the
practice. It then proposes some guiding principles to help ensure that
any such surveillance is consistent with basic privacy and civil liberties
values. It concludes with some observations on how well the NSA
initiatives comport with these first principles, where they fall short,
and how to modify them. The constitutional and statutory issues
raised by the programs have been ably addressed elsewhere,4
including by other participants in this symposium;5 my contribution
will focus more on the policy considerations than the legal ones.
1.
Based on press accounts, the NSA appears to be using the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to engage in programmatic, or
bulk, surveillance-the collection of large amounts of data in an
attempt to identify yet-unknown terrorists, spies, and other national
security threats.6
4 See, e.g., Stephen G. Bradbury, Understanding the NSA Programs: Bulk Acquisition of
Telephone Metadata Under Section 215 and Foreign-Targeted Collection Under Section
702, LAWFARE BLOG (August 30, 2013), http://www.1awfareblog.Com/2o13/o8/steven-g-
bradbury-on-understanding-the-nsa-progams-lawfare-research-paper-series/; Oversight
of the Administration's Use of FISA Authorities, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113d Cong. 84-103 (2013) (statement of Jameel Jaffer); David S. Kris, On the
Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (2013), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare- Research- Paper-
Series-No.-4-2.pdf; Peter Margulies, Evolving Relevance: The Metadata Program and the
Delicate Balance of Secrecy, Deliberation, and National Security,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=240o8o9; NSA Programs, Hearing
Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113d Cong. - (2013) (statement of
Stephen I. Vladeck).
5 See, e.g., Laura Donohue, FISA Reform, 1o ISJLP 599 (2014); Katherine Strandberg,
Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association's Specificity Requirement, lo
ISJLP 327 (2014); John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency's Bulk Data
Surveillance Programs, 1o ISJLP 301 (2014).
6 See, e.g., William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in
Haystacks, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1633, 1635 (2010).
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The first initiative-the so-called telephony metadata or section
215 program-involves the use of court orders under FISA's business
records authority (which was enacted by section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act)7 to collect transactional information about every
telephone call placed over the networks of domestic
telecommunications carriers-i.e., numbers dialed and call duration,
but not content or location data.8 At the risk of understatement, that is
a monumental volume of data.9 Once collected, these records are
warehoused in special government databases and made available to
intelligence analysts under fairly narrow circumstances. The FISA
court's orders allow analysts to query the databases only if there is
"reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that a
particular telephone number is associated with specified foreign
terrorist organizations. '"1o Originally, the NSA was responsible for
determining whether the requisite suspicion was present in a given
case, but President Obama has since directed the NSA to seek FISA
court approval before querying the database, and the court has agreed
to review such requests." In 2012, analysts checked about 300
numbers against the database.12 As this article goes to press, Congress
is on the verge of enacting legislation that would substantially alter the
program. Among other changes, the bill would bar the NSA from itself
750 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
8 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records ofMillions of Verizon Customers
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/jun/o6/nsa-phone-records- verizon-court-
order.
9 Recent indications are that the government is now collecting less than 30 percent of all
domestic call metadata, down from nearly 1oo percent in 2006, in part because of an
ongoing shift from landlines to cell phones. Ellen Nakashima, NSA Is Collecting less than
30 Percent of U.S. Call Data, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-is-collecting-less-than-30-
percent-of-us-call-data-officials-say/2014/02/07/234aoe9e-8fad- ne3-b46a-
5a3dod2l3odastory.html.
10 Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Panel
Discussion: Newseum Special Program -NSA Surveillance Leaks: Facts and Fiction, 8
(June 26, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-and-
interviews/195 -speeches -interviews -2 13/887-transcript-newseum-special-program-nsa-
surveillance-leaks-facts-and-fiction?tmpl=component&format=pdf.
11 Brendan Sasso, Secret Court Approves Obama's Changes to NSA Phone Sweeps,
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/technology/secret-
court-approves-obama-s -changes -to-nsa-phone-sweeps- 20140206.
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collecting bulk telephony metadata. Instead, phone companies would
hold the data, and NSA analysts could only acquire call records that
are associated with a "specific selection term" (such as a particular
phone number) and only with the prior approval of the FISA court.13
The FISA court repeatedly has upheld the section 215 program on
both constitutional grounds (concluding that the acquisition of bulk
telephony metadata was not a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, largely on the strength of the third-party doctrine
recognized in Smith v. Maryland14 and other cases) and statutory
ones (concluding that troves of data sought were tangible things that
are relevant to an authorized investigation, as required by section
215).15 By 2013, 15 different FISA court judges had approved the
program in 35 separate rulings since its inception.16 Other judges are
more divided; in a pair of dueling rulings issued late last year, a
federal judge in Washington, DC invalidated the program while
another in Manhattan affirmed its legality.17
The second program-known as PRISM or section 702-uses court
orders issued under section 702 of FISAs to collect the content of
certain international communications. In particular, the NSA targets
specific non-Americans who are reasonably believed to be located
outside the country, and also engages in bulk collection of some
foreign-to-foreign communications that happen to be passing through
telecommunications infrastructure in the United States.19 The FISA
13 Charlie Savage, Changes to Surveillance Bill Stoke Anger, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.Com/2014/05/21/us/polities/changes-to-surveillance--billstoke-
anger.html?_r= 1 [hereinafter Savage, Surveillance Bill].
14 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
15 See, e.g., In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an order requiring
the production of tangible things from redacted, No. BR 13-109, slip op. at 3 (FISA Ct.
2013) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fise/br13-o9-primary-
order.pdf [hereinafter Section 215 Ruling]; see also Charlie Savage, Extended Ruling by
Secret Court Backs Collection of Phone Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.Com/2013/09/18/us/opinion-by-secret-court-calls-collection-of-
phone-data-legal.html [hereinafter Savage, Extended Ruling].
16 Continued Oversight of U.S. Government Surveillance Authorities, Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113d Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of James M. Cole, Deputy
Attorney General, Department of Justice).
17 Compare Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-o881, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013),
with ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994, 2013 WL 68197o8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013).
18 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
19 Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S.
Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013),
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court does not approve individual surveillance applications each time
the NSA wishes to intercept these communications; instead, it issues
once-a-year blanket authorizations.2o As detailed below, in 2011 the
FISA court struck down the program on constitutional and statutory
grounds after the government disclosed that it was inadvertently
intercepting a significant number of communications involving
Americans;21 the court later upheld the program when the NSA
devised a technical solution that prevented such over-collection.22
Programmatic surveillance initiatives like these differ in simple yet
fundamental ways from the traditional forms of monitoring with
which many people are familiar-i.e., individualized or particularized
surveillance. Individualized surveillance takes place when authorities
have some reason to think that a specific, known person is breaking
the law. Investigators will then obtain a court order authorizing them
to collect information about the target, with the goal of assembling
evidence that can be used to establish guilt in subsequent criminal
proceedings. Individualized surveillance is common in the world of
law enforcement, as under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.23 It is also used in national security
investigations. FISA allows authorities to obtain a court order to
engage in wiretapping if they demonstrate, among other things,
probable cause to believe that the target is "a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power."24
By contrast, programmatic surveillance has very different
objectives and is conducted in a very different manner. It usually
involves the government collecting bulk data and then examining it to
identify previously unknown terrorists, spies, and other national
security threats. A good example of the practice is link analysis, in
http://ww.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-
us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/6/3aocoda8-cebf-iie2-8845-
d970ccb04497 print.html; Jonathan Hall, Washington Post Updates, Hedges On Initial
PRISM Report, FORBES (June 7, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanhall/2o13/o6/o7/washington-post-updates-
hedges-on -initial-prism-report.
20 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
21 Redacted Case Name, Redacted Docket Number, slip op. at 80 (FISA Ct. 2011), available
at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/o8/62o16974-FISA-court-
opinion-with-exemptions.pdf [hereinafter October 3, 2011 Section 702 Ruling].
22 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
23 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012).
2450 U.S.C. § 18O5(a)(2)(A) (2012).
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which authorities compile large amounts of information, use it to map
the social networks of known terrorists-has anyone else used the
same credit card as Mohamed Atta?-and thus identify associates with
whom they may be conspiring.25 (It is also possible, at least in theory,
to subject these large databases to pattern analysis, in which
automated systems search for patterns of behavior that are thought to
be indicative of terrorist activity, but it's not clear that the NSA is
doing so here.) Suspects who have been so identified can then be
subjected to further forms of monitoring to determine their intentions
and capabilities, such as wiretaps under FISA or other authorities. In a
sense, programmatic surveillance is the mirror image of
individualized surveillance. With individualized monitoring,
authorities begin by identifying a suspect and go on to collect
information; with programmatic monitoring, authorities begin by
collecting information and go on to identify a suspect.
Programmatic surveillance is a potentially powerful
counterterrorism tool. The Ra'ed al-Banna incident is a useful
illustration of how the technique, when coupled with old-fashioned
police work, can identify possible threats who otherwise might escape
detection. Another example comes from a 2002 Markle Foundation
study, which found that authorities could have identified the ties
among all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers if they had assembled a large
database of airline reservation information and subjected it to link
analysis.26 In particular, two of the terrorists-Nawaf al-Hamzi and
Khalid al-Mihdhar-were on a government watchlist after attending a
January 2000 al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia. So they could have been
flagged when they bought their tickets. Querying the database to see if
any other passengers had used the pair's mailing addresses would
have led investigators to three more hijackers, including Mohamed
Atta, the plot's operational leader. Six others could have been found
by searching for passengers who used the same frequent-flyer and
telephone numbers as these suspects. And so on. Again, the Markle
study concerns airline reservation data, not the communications data
that are the NSA's focus. But it is still a useful illustration of the
technique's potential.
The government claims that programmatic surveillance has been
responsible for concrete and actual counterterrorism benefits, not just
hypothetical ones. Officials report that PRISM has helped detect and
25 MARK M. LOWENTHAL, INTELLIGENCE: FROM SECRETS TO POLICY 282 (5th ed. 2011).
26 PROTECTING AMERICA'S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE: A REPORT OF THE MARKLE
FOUNDATION TASK FORCE 28 (2002), available at
http://www.markle.org/sites/default/files/nstf full.pdf; see also Baker & Sales, supra
note 1, at 281-82.
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disrupt about 50 terrorist plots worldwide, including ten in the United
States.27 Those numbers include Najibullah Zazi, who attempted to
bomb New York City's subway system in 2oo9, and Khalid Ouazzani,
who plotted to blow up the New York Stock Exchange.28 Authorities
further report that PRISM played an important role in tracking down
David Headley, an American who aided the 20o8 terrorist atrocities in
Bombay, and later planned to attack the offices of a Danish newspaper
that printed cartoons of Mohamed.29 The government also claims at
least one success from the telephony metadata program, though it has
been coy about the specifics: "The NSA, using the business record
FISA, tipped [the FBI] off that [an] individual had indirect contacts
with a known terrorist overseas. . . .We were able to reopen this
investigation, identify additional individuals through a legal process
and were able to disrupt this terrorist activity."3o Quite apart from
foiling attacks, the government also argues that the NSA programs can
conserve scarce investigative resources by helping officials quickly
spot or rule out any foreign involvement in a domestic plot, as after
the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.31
These claims have to be taken with a few grains of salt. Some
observers believe that the government could have discovered the plots
using standard investigative techniques, and without resorting to
extraordinary methods like programmatic surveillance.32 The
metadata program has elicited special skepticism: The President's
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies
bluntly concluded that "the information contributed to terrorist
investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not
essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained
27 Sean Sullivan, NSA Head: Surveillance Helped Thwart More Than 5o Terror Plots,
WASH. POST (June 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2013/o6/18/nsa-head-surveillance-helped-thwart-more-than-50-terror-
attempts/.
28Id
.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Ellen Nakashima, NSA Chief Defends Collecting Americans' Data, WASH. POST (Sept. 25,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-chief-defends-
collecting-americans -data/2013/09/25/5db2583c- 25fl- ie3-b75d-
5b7f66349852_story.html.
32 Abby Ohlheiser, The NSA's Best Defense of PRSM Didn't Even Last a Week, ATLANTIC
WIRE (June 11, 2013), http://www.thewire.com/national/2o13/o6/nsas-only-terrorist-
defense-prism-didnt-even-last-week/66143/.
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in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders."33 The
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board reached the same
conclusion.34 (Judicial opinion is split on the program's value. One
judge has expressed "serious doubts" about its utility,35 while another
has concluded that its effectiveness "cannot be seriously disputed.")36
Furthermore, we should always be cautious when evaluating the
merits of classified intelligence initiatives on the basis of selective and
piecemeal revelations, as officials might tailor the information they
release in a bid to shape public opinion.37 But even if specific claimed
successes remain contested, programmatic surveillance in general can
still be a useful counterterrorism technique.
As these examples imply, effective programmatic surveillance
often requires huge troves of information-e.g., large databases of
airline reservations, compilations of metadata concerning telephonic
and internet communications, and so on. This is why it typically will
not be feasible to limit bulk collection to particular, known individuals
who are already suspected of being terrorists or spies. Some officials
have defended the NSA programs by pointing out that, "[i]f you're
looking for the needle in a haystack, you have to have the haystack."38
That metaphor doesn't strike me as terribly helpful; rummaging
around in a pile of hay is, after all, a paradigmatic image of futility.
But, the idea can be expressed in a more compelling way.
Programmatic surveillance cannot be done in a particularized manner.
The whole point of the technique is to identify unknown threats to the
national security; by definition, it cannot be restricted to threats that
have already been identified. We can't limit programmatic
33 THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING
WORLD 104 (2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP].
34 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 11 (2013), available at
http://www.pelob.gov/All%2oDocuments/Report%2oon%2othe%2oTelephone%2oRecor
ds%2oProgram/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf.
35 Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-o881, 2013 WL 6598728, at *17 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
36 ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994, 2013 WL 68197o8, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013).
37 JAMES BAMFORD, BODY OF SECRETS: ANATOMY OF THE ULTRA-SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY: FROM THE COLD WAR THROUGH THE DAWN OFA NEW CENTURY 384 (2001).
38 Dana Bash & Tom Cohen, Officials Cite Thwarted Plots, Oversight in Defending
Surveillance, CNN (June 19, 2013), http://www.enn.Com/2013/o6/18/polities/nsa-
leaks/index.html.
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surveillance to the next Mohamed Atta when we have no idea who the
next Mohamed Atta is-and when the goal of the exercise is indeed to
identify the next Mohamed Atta.
Programmatic surveillance thus can help remedy some of the
difficulties that arise when monitoring covert adversaries like
international terrorists. FISA and other particularized surveillance
tools are useful when authorities want to monitor targets whose
identities are already known. But they are less useful when authorities
are trying to identify unknown targets. The problem arises because, in
order to obtain a wiretap order from the FISA court, the government
usually must demonstrate probable cause to believe that the target is a
foreign power or agent of a foreign power.3 9 This is a fairly
straightforward task when the target's identity is already known-e.g.,
a diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. But the task is
considerably more difficult when the government's reason for
surveillance is to detect targets who are presently unknown-e.g., al-
Qaeda members who operate in the shadows. How can you convince
the FISA court that Smith is an agent of a foreign power when you
know nothing about Smith-his name, nationality, date of birth,
location, or even whether he is a single person or several dozen? The
government typically won't know those things unless it has collected
some information about Smith-such as by surveilling him. And
there's the rub. Programmatic monitoring helps avoid the crippling
Catch-22 that can arise under particularized surveillance regimes like
FISA: officials can't surveil unless they show that the target is a spy or
terrorist, but sometimes they can't show that an unknown target is a
spy or terrorist unless they have surveilled him.
II.
While programmatic surveillance can be an important
counterterrorism tool, it also-given the sweeping scope of the data
collection on which it usually relies-raises profound concerns about
civil liberties and privacy. These concerns are not merely hypothetical.
To take just a few justifiably notorious examples of abusive
monitoring, albeit of the particularized rather than programmatic
variety, the FBI repeatedly wiretapped Dr. Martin Luther King and his
associates, purportedly to discover whether the civil rights icon had
any ties to the Soviet Union.40 And during the 1964 presidential
39 50 U.S.C. § 18o5(a)(2)(A) (2012).
40 David J. Garrow, The FBI andMartin Luther King, THE ATLANTIC (July 2002),
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/issues/2oo2/o7/garrow.htm.
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campaign, LBJ aide Bill Moyers-yes, that Bill Moyers-directed the
FBI to dig around for evidence that some of Barry Goldwater's staffers
were homosexuals.41 The possibility of abuse makes it critical to
establish a set of first principles to govern when and how
programmatic monitoring is to be conducted. It is especially
important to think about these baseline rules now, when the
technique is still in its relative youth. This will allow programmatic
surveillance to be nudged in privacy-protective directions as it
develops into maturity. The critical question is how to take advantage
of its potentially significant national security benefits without running
afoul of fundamental civil liberties and privacy values. In other words,
what can be done to domesticate programmatic surveillance?
This is not the place to flesh out the precise details of the ideal
surveillance regime, but we can identify certain basic principles that
academics, policymakers, and others should consider when thinking
about bulk data collection and analysis. Two broad categories of
principles should govern any such system; one concerns its formation,
the other its implementation. First, there are the architectural or
structural considerations-the principles that address when
programmatic surveillance should take place, the process by which
such a regime should be adopted, and how the system should be
organized. Second, there are the operational considerations-the
principles that inform the manner in which programmatic
surveillance should be carried out in practice.
A.
As for the structural considerations, one of the most important is
what might be called an anti-unilateralism principle. A system of
programmatic surveillance should not be put into effect on the say-so
of the executive branch, but rather should be a collaborative effort that
involves Congress (in the form of authorizing legislation) or the
judiciary (in the form of FISA court review of the initiatives).42 An
example of the former is FISA itself, which Congress enacted in 1978.
At the time, the NSA was engaged in bulk collection, without judicial
approval, of certain international communications into and out of the
United States-namely, by tapping into offshore telecommunications
cables and by eavesdropping on satellite based radio signals. FISA's
41 Laurence H. Silberman, Hoover's Institution, WALL ST. J. (JULY 20,2005),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB11825o564739o371.
42 See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 123-26, 205-07 (2007).
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famously convoluted definition of "electronic surveillance"43 preserved
these preexisting practices even as Congress was imposing a new
requirement of judicial approval for other kinds of monitoring.44 An
example of the latter concerns the warrantless Terrorist Surveillance
Program, under which the NSA was intercepting, outside the FISA
framework, certain communications between suspected al-Qaeda
figures overseas and people located in the United States. After that
program's existence was revealed in late 2005, the executive branch
persuaded the FISA court to issue orders allowing it to proceed subject
to various limits.45 (That accommodation eventually proved
unworkable, and the executive then worked with Congress to put the
program on a more solid legislative footing through the temporary
Protect America Act of 200746 and the permanent FISA Amendments
Act of 20o8.)47
Anti-unilateralism is important for several reasons. To take the
most obvious, Congress and the courts can help prevent executive
overreach.48 The risk of abuse is lessened if the executive branch must
enlist its partners before commencing a new surveillance initiative.
Congress might decline to permit bulk collection in circumstances
where it concludes that ordinary, individualized monitoring would
suffice, or it might authorize programmatic surveillance subject to
various privacy protections. In addition, inviting many voices to the
decision-making table increases the probability of sound outcomes.
More participants with diverse perspectives can also help mitigate the
groupthink tendencies to which the executive branch is sometimes
43 50 U.S.C. § 18oi(f) (2012).
44 David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, in LEGISLATING
THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 217, 224-25 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009).
45 David Kris, A Guide to the New FISA Bill, Part II, BALKINIZATION (June 22, 2OO8),
http://balldn.blogspot.Com/2oo8/o6/guide-to-new-fisa-bill-part-ii.html.
46 Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007).
47 Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
48 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11, at xv (2012) ("[D]emocratic and judicial forces change presidential authorities
and actions deemed imprudent or wrong and constrain presidential discretion in
numerous ways."). But see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND:AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 4 (2 010) (arguing that we now live in an "age
after the separation of powers, and the legally constrained executive is now a historical
curiosity").
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subject.49 If we're going to engage in programmatic surveillance, it
should be the result of give and take among all three branches of the
federal government, or at least between its two political branches, not
the result of executive edict.
A second principle follows from the first: Programmatic
surveillance should, wherever possible, have explicit statutory
authorization. Congress does not "hide elephants in mouseholes,"5o
the saying goes, and we should not presume that Congress meant to
conceal its approval of a potentially controversial programmatic
surveillance system in the penumbrae and interstices of obscure
federal statutes. Instead, Congress normally should use express and
specific legislation when it wants to okay bulk data collection. Clear
laws will help remove any doubt about the authorized scope of the
approved surveillance, thereby promoting legal certainty. Express
congressional backing also helps give the monitoring an air of
legitimacy. And, a requirement that programmatic surveillance
usually should be approved by clear legislation helps promote
accountability by minimizing the risk of congressional shirking.51 If
the political winds shift, and a legislatively approved program
becomes unpopular, Congress will not be able to hide behind an
ambiguous statutory grant of power and deflect responsibility to the
President.
Of course, exacting legislative clarity may not be possible in all
cases. Sometimes, explicit statutory language might compromise
intelligence sources and methods, enabling surveillance targets to
evade detection52 or provoking a diplomatic row.53 But some degree of
clarity often will be feasible, and the Protect America Act and FISA
Amendments Act are good examples of what the process could look
like. In both cases, Congress clearly and unambiguously approved
49 See, e.g., Steve Smith, Groupthink and the Hostage Rescue Mission, 15 BRIT. J. PoL. SCI.
117 (1984).
50 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
51 See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REv. 2085, 2155 (2002) (emphasizing that "ambiguity allows Congress to evade
accountability").
52 See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985).
53 See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1306, 1323 (2004).
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monitoring that the executive branch previously claimed54 was within
the President's inherent constitutional powers and, in any event, was
implicitly authorized by a combination of FISA (which at the time
made it unlawful to engage in electronic surveillance "except as
authorized by [statute]")55, the 9/11 Authorization for Use of Military
Force (which allows the president to use "all necessary and
appropriate force" against those responsible for the attacks),56 and the
Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (which interpreted
the AUMF's reference to "all necessary and appropriate force" to
include "fundamental and accepted" incidents of war, such as
detention and perhaps, by implication, electronic surveillance).57
Next, there is the question of transparency. Whenever possible,
programmatic surveillance systems should be adopted through open
and transparent debates that allow an informed public to
meaningfully participate. The systems also should be operated in as
transparent a manner as possible. This in turn requires the
government to reveal enough information about the initiative, even if
at a fairly high level of generality, that the public is able to effectively
weigh its benefits and costs. It is especially important that officials
provide fairly granular details about a given program's claimed
benefits, such as its value in foiling terrorist plots, so the public can
evaluate whether those gains are worth the resulting tradeoffs.
Transparency is important because it helps promote
accountability; it enables the public to hold their representatives in
Congress and the executive branch responsible for the choices they
make. "[I]nformed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment."58  Transparency also fosters democratic
participation, ensuring that the people are ultimately responsible for
deciding our national security policies. And, it can help dispel
suspicions about programs that initially might seem nefarious but end
up looking innocuous when their details are known.59 Again, perfect
54 Letter from William E. Mosehella, Assistant Att'y Gen., Off. of Legis. Aff., U.S. Dep't of
Justice., to Pat Roberts, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, et al. (Dec. 22,
2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/dojl22205.pdf.
55 50 U.S.C. § 18o9(a)(i) (2000).
56 Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
57 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
58 Grossjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
59 See, e.g., Richard Gid Powers, Introduction to DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY:
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 58 (1998) (emphasizing that a lack of transparency "gives rise
to fantasies that corrode belief in the possibilities of democratic government").
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transparency will not always be feasible-a public debate about the
fine-grained details of national security surveillance can compromise
extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods. But
transparency should be the default rule, and even where the
government's operational needs rule out detailed disclosures, a
generic description of a proposed program is better than none at all.
Finally, any programmatic surveillance regime should observe an
anti-mission-creep principle. Bulk data collection should only be used
to investigate and prevent terrorism, espionage, and other serious
threats to the national security. It should be off limits in regular
criminal investigations. Moreover, if programmatic surveillance
happens to turn up evidence of ordinary crime, intelligence officials
normally should not be able to refer it to their law enforcement
counterparts for prosecution-though there should be an exception for
truly grave crimes, such as offenses involving a risk of death or serious
bodily injury and crimes involving the exploitation of children. This is
a simple matter of costs and benefits. The upside of preventing deadly
terrorist attacks and other national security perils can be so significant
that we as a nation may be willing to sanction extraordinary
investigative techniques like bulk data collection. But the calculus
looks very different where the promised upside is prosecuting garden-
variety crimes like income tax evasion or insurance fraud. We might
be willing to tolerate an additional burden on our privacy interests to
stop the next 9/11, but that doesn't mean we should make the same
sacrifice to stop tax cheats and fraudsters.
B.
As for the operational considerations, among the most important
is the need for external checks on programmatic surveillance. In
particular, bulk data collection should have to undergo some form of
judicial review, such as by the FISA court, in which the government
demonstrates that it meets the applicable constitutional and statutory
standards. Ideally, the judiciary would give its approval before
collection begins. But this will not always be possible, in which case
timely post-collection judicial review will have to suffice. (FISA has a
comparable mechanism for temporary warrantless surveillance in
emergency situations.) 60 Programmatic surveillance also should be
subject to robust congressional oversight. This could take a variety of
forms, including informal consultations with members of Congress
when designing the surveillance regime (including, at a minimum,
congressional leadership and members of the applicable committees),
60 50 U.S.C. § 18o5(e) (2012).
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as well as regular briefings to appropriate personnel on the operation
of the system and periodic oversight hearings.
Of course, judicial review in the context of bulk collection won't
necessarily look the same as it does in the familiar setting of
individualized monitoring of specific targets. If investigators want to
examine the telephony metadata associated with a particular
terrorism suspect, they can apply to the FISA court for a pen register
or trap and trace order upon a showing that the information sought is
relevant to an ongoing national security investigation. 61 But, as
explained above, that kind of particularized showing often won't be
possible where authorities are dealing with unknown threats, and
where the very purpose of the surveillance is to identify those threats.
In these situations, reviewing courts may find it necessary to allow the
government to collect large amounts of data without individualized
suspicion. This doesn't mean that privacy safeguards must be
abandoned and the executive given free rein. Instead, courts could be
tasked with scrutinizing the initiative's overall structure and operation
to determine its compatibility with constitutional and statutory
requirements. And courts further could require authorities to
demonstrate some level of individualized suspicion before accessing
the data that has been collected. Protections for privacy and civil
liberties thus can migrate from the collection phase of the intelligence
cycle to earlier and later stages, such as the systems design and
analysis stages. 62
In more general terms, because programmatic surveillance
involves the collection of large troves of data, it likely means some
dilution of the familiar ex ante restrictions that protect privacy by
constraining the government from acquiring information in the first
place. It therefore becomes critically important to devise meaningful
ex post safeguards that can achieve similar forms of privacy
protection. In short, restrictions on the government's ability to access
and use data that it has gathered must substitute for restrictions on
the government's ability to gather that data at all; what I have
elsewhere called use limits must stand in for collection limits.63
This sort of oversight by the courts and Congress provides an
obvious, first-order level of protection for privacy and civil liberties-
an external veto serves as a direct check on possible executive
6150 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012).
62 See LOWENTHAL, supra note 25, at 57-70 (describing various stages of the intelligence
cycle, including collection, processing and exploitation, analysis, and dissemination).
63 Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1124-27 (2009).
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misconduct. Judicial and legislative checks also offer an important
second-order form of protection. The mere possibility of an outsider's
veto can have a chilling effect on executive misconduct, discouraging
officials from questionable activities that would have to undergo, and
might not survive, external review.64 Moreover, external checks can
channel the executive's scarce resources into truly important
surveillance and away from relatively unimportant monitoring. This is
so because oversight increases the administrative costs of collecting
bulk data-e.g., preparing a surveillance application, persuading the
judiciary to approve it, briefing the courts and Congress about how the
program has been implemented, and so on. These increased costs
encourage the executive to prioritize collection that is expected to
yield truly valuable intelligence and, conversely, to forego collection
that is expected to produce information of lesser value.
In addition to oversight by outsiders, a programmatic surveillance
regime also should feature a system of internal checks within the
executive branch, to review collection before it occurs, after the fact,
or both. As for the ex ante checks, internal watchdogs should be
charged with scrutinizing proposed bulk collection to verify that it
complies with the applicable constitutional and statutory rules, and
also to ensure that appropriate protections are in place for privacy and
civil liberties. The Justice Department's Office of Intelligence is a well
known example. The unit, which presents the government's
surveillance applications to the FISA court, subjects these requests to
exacting scrutiny with the goal of increasing the likelihood of
surviving judicial review. 65 Indeed, the office has a strong incentive to
ensure that the applications it presents are airtight, so as to preserve
its credibility with the FISA court. 66 Ex post checks include such
commonplace mechanisms as agency-level inspectors general, who
can audit bulk collection programs, assess their legality, and make
policy recommendations to improve their operation, as well as entities
like the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which perform
similar functions across the executive branch as a whole. Another
important ex post check is to offer meaningful whistleblower
protections to officials who know about programs that violate
constitutional or statutory requirements. Allowing officials to bring
their concerns to ombudsmen within the executive branch (and then
eventually to Congress) can help root out lawlessness and also relieve
64 See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales, Self-Restraint and National Security, 6 J. NAT'L SEC.
L. & POL'Y 227, 280 (2012).
65 Id. at 259-6o.
66 Id. at 285-86.
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the felt necessity of leaking information about highly classified
programs to the media.
These and other internal checks can achieve all three of the
benefits promised by traditional judicial and legislative oversight-
executive branch watchdogs can veto surveillance they conclude
would be unlawful, the mere possibility of such vetoes can chill
overreach, and increasing the costs of monitoring can redirect scarce
resources toward truly important surveillance. External and internal
checks thus operate together as a system; the two types of restraints
are rough substitutes for one another. If outside players like Congress
and the courts are subjecting the executive's programmatic
surveillance activities to especially rigorous scrutiny, the need for
comparably robust safeguards within the executive branch tends to
diminish. Conversely, if the executive's discretion is constrained
internally through strict approval processes, audit requirements, and
so on, the legislature and judiciary may choose not to hold the
executive to the exacting standards they otherwise would. In short,
certain situations may have less need to use traditional interbranch
separation of powers and checks and balances to protect privacy and
civil liberties because the executive branch is subject to an "internal
separation of powers" 67 that can accomplish much the same thing.
A word of caution: It is important not to take in-house review too
far. Internal oversight can do more than deter overreach. It can also
deter necessary national security operations, with potentially deadly
results. The pre-9/11 information sharing wall is a notorious example
of an internal check gone awry. The predecessor of DOJ's Office of
Intelligence interpreted FISA to sharply restrict intelligence officials
from sharing information or otherwise coordinating with their law
enforcement counterparts, leading one prophetic FBI agent to lament
on the eve of 9/11 that "someday somebody will die."68 DOJ lawyers
were so committed to the wall that one senior official successfully
lobbied the chief judge of the FISA court to issue an order formally
adopting the wall requirements, which up to then had only taken the
form of internal Justice Department guidelines. 69 There are other
examples as well. In the 199os, executive branch lawyers vetoed CIA
67 Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006).
68 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 271 (2004).
69 STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN'T STOPPING TOMORROW'S
TERRORISM TODAY 57 (2010), available at http://www.skatingonstilts.com/skating-on-
stilts/tired-of-reading-chapters-backwards.html.
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plans to use targeted killing against Osama bin Laden, and members
of the armed forces' Judge Advocate General corps have occasionally
objected to strikes on particular targets even though they would be
permissible under the laws of war.70 There is no universally applicable
answer to the question, how much internal oversight is enough? The
right balance cannot be known a priori, but rather must be struck on a
case by case basis taking account of the highly contingent and unique
circumstances presented by a given surveillance program, the threat it
seeks to combat, the privacy concerns it raises, and other factors.
A third operational consideration is the need for strong
minimization requirements. Virtually all surveillance raises the risk
that officials will intercept innocuous data in the course of gathering
evidence of illicit activity. Inevitably, some chaff will be swept up with
the wheat. The risk is especially acute with programmatic surveillance,
in which the government assembles large amounts of data in the
search for clues about a small handful of terrorists, spies, and other
national security threats.71 Minimization is one way to deal with the
problem. Minimization rules limit what the government may do with
data that does not appear pertinent to a national security
investigation-e.g., how long it may be retained, the conditions under
which it will be stored, the rules for accessing it, the purposes for
which it may be used, the entities with which it may be shared, and so
on. Congress appropriately has required intelligence officials to adopt
minimization procedures, both under FISA's longstanding
particularized surveillance regime72 and under the more recent
authorities permitting bulk collection.73 But the rules need not be
identical. Because programmatic surveillance often involves the
acquisition of a much larger trove of non-pertinent information, the
minimization rules for bulk collection ideally would contain stricter
limits on the use of inadvertently collected information for purposes
unrelated to national security. In other words, the minimization
procedures should reflect the anti-mission-creep principle described
above.
Finally, programmatic surveillance systems should have
technological safeguards that protect privacy and civil liberties by
restricting access to sensitive information and tracking what officials
70 Sales, Self-Restraint, supra note 63, at 247-56.
71 LOWENTHAL, supra note 25, at 72-73.
72 50 U.S.C. §§ 18o(h), 18o5(a)(3) (2012).
73 50 U.S.C. §§ i88ia(e)(i)(A), (e).
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do with it.74 As Larry Lessig has emphasized, software features that
make it impossible to engage in certain undesirable conduct can
substitute for legal prohibitions on the same behavior; "code is law."75
In particular, permissioning and authentication technologies can help
ensure that sensitive databases are only available to officials who need
them to perform various counterterrorism functions. And auditing
tools can track who accesses the information, when, in what manner,
and for what purposes. These mechanisms show promise but thus far
have a mixed record at preventing unauthorized access to and use of
sensitive data. Access logs helped the State Department quickly
identify and discipline the outside contractors who improperly
accessed the private passport files of various presidential candidates
in 2008.76 But government employees like Edward Snowden and
Bradley Manning obviously have been able to exfiltrate huge amounts
of classified information from protected systems, either because
technological controls were not in place or because they were able to
evade them. Even if these mechanisms are not now an infallible
safeguard against abuse, the basic principle seems sound: A
commitment to privacy can be baked into a programmatic surveillance
regime at the level of systems architecture.
III.
Judged by these standards, how well do the NSA initiatives
measure up? As far as we can tell from the incomplete publicly
available information, they fare well along several dimensions. But in
other respects the programs should be adjusted to better conform to
the first principles sketched out above. Several relatively modest
reforms would preserve the essential features of the programs but
ensure more robust protections for privacy and civil liberties.
Before turning to areas that need improvement, it's worth
spending a few moments considering what the government has gotten
right. One of the most noteworthy features of the NSA programs is
their rejection of unilateralism. Rather than justifying the collection of
international communications and telephony metadata on the basis of
74 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 68, at 334-41; MARKLE FOUNDATION, supra note 25, at 15,
17, 19,33.
75 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 5-6 (2oo6), available at
http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf.
76 Glenn Kessler, Rice Apologizes For Breach of Passport Data, WASH. POST. (Mar. 22,
2OO8), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2oo8/o3/2/AR2oo8o32100377.html.
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its own constitutional authorities, the executive branch in both
instances has sought to ground its conduct in statutory powers
conferred on it by Congress. This anti-unilateralism is especially
significant because it is something of an historical anomaly; the
executive routinely has undertaken national security surveillance
without legislative backing. Consider, for example, wiretaps in the
pre-FISA era, which were grounded solely in the president's
constitutional powers,77 or the executive's unilateral conduct of
physical searches before FISA was amended in the 1990s to expressly
authorize that activity,78 or the warrantless Terrorist Surveillance
Program of the early 2000S.
Of course, Congress has been much more explicit about approving
the section 702 program than the telephony metadata initiative. The
latter is said to be based on section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,
which allows officials to obtain a FISA court order requiring the
production of "any tangible things" upon a showing that they are
"relevant" to an authorized national security investigation.79 Section
215 is often understood as FISA's counterpart to the rules governing
grand jury subpoenas. Yet the government is using it to collect a great
deal more information than a typical subpoena obtains, and at least
one legislator who was actively involved in crafting the statute claims
that Congress never intended it to be used in this way.8o To put it
mildly, section 215 is a more roundabout authorization than section
702.
Yet Congress has been involved in approving the metadata
program, albeit in a way that is less specific and transparent than
ideal. Section 215 is a temporary provision that is subject to periodic
legislative renewals. During the congressional debates over
reauthorization in 2010 and 2011, the intelligence community
prepared classified briefing materials that laid out unusually vivid
details about the program.1 The briefing papers described what
77 See Swire, supra note 53, at 1313-14.
78 See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authorityfor National Security
Surveillance, 5o AM. U. L. REv. 1, 77 (2000).
79 50 U.S.C. §§ 186i(a)(i), (b)(2)(A) (2012).
8o See Letter from Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. to Attorney General Eric H. Holder,
Jr. (June 6, 2013), available at
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/uploadedfiles/sensenbrenner letter to attorney-genera
1 erie holder.pdf.
8i See Office of Legislative Affairs, Dep't of Justice, Report on the National Security
Agency's Bulk Collection Programs Affected by USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization (2009),
available at
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information is collected, when the database may be queried, and-
critically-the fact that the program is operated "pursuant to the
'business records' provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) (commonly referred to as 'section 215'),"82 as well as the
fact that the FISA court had approved the government's
interpretation. Officials further asked that the materials be shared
with "all Members of Congress." 83 In 2010 and again the following
year, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence circulated "Dear Colleague" letters
encouraging senators to review the briefing.8 4 On the House side, in
2010 a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
made a floor statement urging colleagues to review the materials.8 5
(He does not appear to have renewed the invitation in 2011.) In
addition to making these written materials available, administration
officials reportedly conducted 13 in-person classified briefings for
members about the section 215 program.8 6
Members of Congress who learned from these briefings that the
executive branch was interpreting section 215 to authorize the
telephony metadata program, and who then voted to reauthorize that
legislation, can be said at some level to have embraced the executive's
interpretation. Congress in 2001 may not have understood section 215
as anything more than a routine subpoena-like tool for the national
security context. But Congress in 2010 and 2011 was put on notice
that the executive branch was now reading the statute more
expansively to authorize bulk data collection. In any event, the critical
point is not, as some judges and commentators have concluded, that
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2oo9_CoverLetterReport-Collection.pdf
[hereinafter 2oo9 DOJ Report]; Office of Legislative Affairs, Dep't of Justice, Report on
the National Security Agency's Bulk Collection Programs Affected by USA PATRIOT Act
Reauthorization (2011), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2o lCoverLettersReportCollection.pdf
[hereinafter 2011 DOJ Report].
82 2009 DOJ REPORT, supra note 80, at 2; 2011 DOJ REPORT, supra note 80, at 2.
83 2009 DOJ REPORT, supra note 80, at 1; 2011 DOJ REPORT, supra note 80, at 1.
84 SEN. DIANNE FEINSTEIN AND SEN. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE,
1 1 2 TH CONG., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Feb. 8, 2011), available at
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/SeleetCommitteelntelligenceFeb13.pdf.
85 156 Cong. Rec. H838 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Alcee Hastings).
86 Josh Gerstein, Official: 13 Briefings for Hill on Call-Tracking Legal Provision, POLITICO
(June 8, 2013), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/o6/official-
briefings -for-hill-on-calltracking-legal- 165732.html.
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Congress's reauthorization votes effectively ratified the executive's
interpretation of section 215. 87 What matters for our purposes is that
the executive went to unusual lengths to inform Congress about the
program in an effort to obtain its assent.
In addition to Congress, the FISA court plays a key role in
overseeing the NSA programs. Both initiatives involve various forms
of ex ante judicial scrutiny. The telephony metadata program is
reviewed every three months, when a prior court order authorizing
collection expires and comes up for renewal. The court most recently
reauthorized the program on June 19, 2014,88 after having issued an
opinion on August 29, 2013 detailing its conclusion that the program
is constitutionally and statutorily permissible.8 9 Likewise, the FISA
court examines the government's section 702 surveillance applications
before approving collection of certain international communications
for a period of one year.90 The court is also responsible for reviewing
and approving the minimization procedures that govern how both
programs operate in practice.91 Again, the FISA court's role in
overseeing programmatic surveillance represents a sharp departure
from the historic norm. In the 198Os, when the NSA was engaging in
bulk collection of satellite-based international communications
(which Congress specially exempted from regulation under FISA), the
court played no part in overseeing those operations.
The FISA court is often derided as a rubber stamp. But there are a
number of indications that it does in fact serve as a real constraint on
the executive branch. Over the three month period between July and
September 2013, the court refused to approve nearly a quarter of the
government's surveillance requests, insisting on "substantive changes"
before okaying the applications-e.g., requiring officials to submit
87 Section 215 Ruling, supra note 15, at 23-27; ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13 Civ. 3994, 2013 VVL
68197o8, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013); see also Benjamin Wittes &Jane Chong, LAWFARE
BLOG (Sept. 19, 2013, 12:03 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.Com/2013/09/congress-is-still-
naked/. But see Orin Kerr, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 17, 2013, 7:39 PM),
http://www.volokh.Com/2013/09/17/thoughts-august-2013-fise-opinion-section-215/
(criticizing FISA court's ratification analysis).
88 Joint Statement From the ODNI and DOJ on the Declassification of Renewal of
Collection Under Section 501 of FISA (June 20, 2014), available at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/198-press-releases-2014/1082-
joint-statement-from-the-odni-and-doj-on-the-declassification-of-renewal-of-collection-
under-section-501-of-fisa.
89 Savage, Extended Ruling, supra note 15.
90 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
9150 U.S.C. § 1861(g) (section 215 program), §1881a(e) (section 702 program).
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more information to justify the monitoring or altering the scope of the
authority sought.92 The FISA court may not say "no" very often, but it
pretty frequently says "not yet."
Recently declassified documents suggest that the FISA court has
meaningfully checked NSA bulk collection in particular.93 In May
2011, the administration told the FISA court about an over-collection
problem in the PRISM program. Because of the way some
communications are bundled, the NSA had been collecting some
purely domestic communications (which may not be intercepted
under section 702) in the course of collecting communications
involving persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States
(which may). After a series of written submissions, meetings between
court and government personnel, and a hearing, the court on October
3, 2011 issued an 81-page opinion concluding that the program
violated both the Fourth Amendment and section 702, principally
because the NSA's minimization procedures were inadequate.94 The
government responded by developing new procedures to segregate the
permissible intercepts from the impermissible ones, applying the
procedures to previous acquisitions, and purging tainted records from
its database. The FISA court then ruled in opinions dated November
30, 2011 and September 25, 2012 that the revised program passed
muster. A 2oo9 episode involving the telephony metadata program
followed a similar pattern-the executive's discovery of violations,
disclosure to the FISA court, judicial rebuke, institution of reforms,
and judicial approval of the revised program.95
At one level this is a dishearteningly familiar story of government
misconduct. But the deeper lesson the episode reveals is that, when
confronted with such errors, the FISA court is willing to intervene and
92 See Letter from Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, FISA Ct., to Charles E. Grassley,
Ranking Member, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (Oct. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/1o/ranking-member-grassley-
letter 131011.pdf.
93 See Ellen Nakashima, NSA Gathered Thousands of Americans'E-mails Before Court
Ordered It to Revise Its Tactics, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-
americans -e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/o8/21/146ba4b6-oago -1e3-
b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html.
94 October 3, 2011 Section 702 Ruling, supra note 21, at 2.
95 Ellen Nakashima et al., Declassified Court Documents Highlight NSA Violations in Data
Collection for Surveillance, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/declassified-court-documents-
highlight-nsa-violations/2013/09/1o/6ob5822c-la4b- e3-a628-
7e6dde8f889d story.html.
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enforce basic constitutional and statutory guarantees-which is
exactly what we would expect an Article III court to do. The PRISM
incident also suggests that the government takes seriously its
obligations to self-police and disclose problems to the court. Indeed,
officials have an interest in doing so. The government's ability to
persuade the FISA court to approve its surveillance requests depends
in large part on its credibility with the judges. And that goodwill would
dissipate if the court independently learned, such as though leaks,
about violations that officials had failed to disclose. It would be a
mistake to take too much comfort from this incident, since it is
impossible to say how representative it is. Still, it provides some
reason for optimism that FISA court oversight-and the internal
oversight on which it depends-is more than perfunctory.
A third noteworthy feature of PRISM, though not the metadata
program, is the unusual transparency surrounding its adoption.
PRISM appears to be a straightforward application of FISA section
702, which Congress enacted in 20o8. The legislation was the result of
a lengthy and detailed public debate touched off by revelations in late
2005 that the Terrorist Surveillance Program was intercepting certain
international communications without judicial approval. During the
ensuing three year national conversation, intelligence officials
repeatedly explained to Congress and the public why they thought new
statutory authority was necessary, and advocacy groups and other
interested parties repeatedly challenged these representations and
urged Congress to reject, or at least curtail, any new surveillance
powers. Newspaper editorial pages, blogs, talk radio programs, and
many other media organs hashed out the legal and policy issues. FISA
was front-page news. In short, the section 702 program shouldn't
come as a surprise because the nation thoroughly debated it for three
years before Congress expressly approved it.
While the NSA programs feature several important safeguards to
help protect privacy and civil liberties, there is room for improvement.
Policymakers should consider altering the minimization rules to
better prevent mission creep, adding an adversarial element to certain
aspects of the FISA court's proceedings, and enacting new legislation
to place the telephony metadata program on a more stable statutory
footing.
First, the minimization rules that govern the section 702 program
allow intelligence officials to share information with federal law
enforcement if it contains "evidence [of] a crime."96 The government
96 Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with
Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended at 5 (July 28, 2oo9), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documenteloud.org/documents/716634/exhibit-b.pdf.
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recently has clarified that "nonpublicly available signals intelligence
that the United States collects in bulk" may only be used to counter
certain enumerated national security threats, as well as
"[t]ransnational criminal threats."97 Even with that restriction,
however, the rules seem too permissive. On their face, the
minimization rules permit the fruits of PRISM surveillance to be used
in investigations of even minor federal offenses, such as mail fraud
and theft, so long as they have some "[t]ransnational" aspect. The
problem is that the relative costs and benefits of surveillance depend
on the magnitude of the offense under investigation. Just because
we're willing to countenance the use of extraordinary methods to
prevent terrorism, it doesn't mean the same techniques should be
used to combat tax delinquency. Policymakers should tighten the list
of crimes for which sharing is allowed. Of course, intelligence officials
certainly should be able to tell their law enforcement counterparts
when they come across evidence of terrorism, espionage, and other
national security threats-the need for cops and spies to share more
counterterrorism information is one of the enduring lessons of 9/11.98
And other serious crimes like those involving risk of death or serious
bodily injury, or child exploitation, should be on the list as well.
At the same time, we should not overestimate the NSA's
enthusiasm for sharing the intelligence it gathers. Regardless of what
the minimization rules permit, the NSA will have strong incentives to
resist sharing information with or otherwise helping its bureaucratic
rivals.99 Indeed, the New York Times recently reported widespread
frustration among law enforcement officials over the NSA's reluctance
to assist their investigations of routine offenses like "money
laundering, counterfeiting and even copyright infringement"; their
requests are usually denied "because the links to terrorism or foreign
intelligence" are considered too "tenuous."''1 (Note that the story
addresses NSA resources in general, not telephony metadata and
PRISM data in particular.) In short, institutional self-interest and
97 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, LIST OF PERMISSIBLE USES OF
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED IN BULK (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://icontherecord.tumblr.cOm/post/76245354o8/ist-of-permissible-uses-of-signals-
intelligence.
98 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 68, at 416-19.
99 See Nathan Alexander Sales, Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies and
Information Sharing, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 279 (2010).
100 Eric Lichtblau & Michael S. Schmidt, Other Agencies Clamor for Data N.S.A. Compiles,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.Com/2013/o8/04/us/other-agencies-
clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?pagewanted= all.
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legal restrictions on sharing can be rough substitutes. And while self-
interest will often lead the NSA to refuse access to sensitive
intelligence in garden-variety criminal cases, these naturally occurring
bureaucratic incentives should be supplemented with strong
minimization rules that prevent inappropriate mission creep.
Second, Congress's decision to subject the executive branch's
surveillance requests to ex ante judicial review-one of the most
important innovations of the original 1978 FISA-has created a
powerful tool for preventing overreach. But this mechanism has its
limits, because the FISA court's proceedings are conducted ex parte. 10 1
This can deprive the court of the benefits of the ordinary adversarial
process, which relies on the presentation of opposing points of view to
sharpen and refine legal and factual disputes. For that reason,
policymakers should provide for adversarial review in the FISA court
in certain circumstances. Adversarial proceedings would harmonize
with the commonplace intelligence technique known as "red teaming,"
in which special groups of analysts improve intelligence products by
preparing assessments that challenge consensus views.1o2
The need to add some sort of adversarial element to FISA has
quickly become conventional wisdom, having been embraced by both
major NSA reform bills in Congress (Feinstein-Chambliss1 °3 and
Leahy-Sensenbrenner),O4 by the President's Review Group,o5 and by
President Obama himself.10 6 Indeed, at press time, Congress is poised
to enact legislation that generally would require the FISA court to
appoint an adversarial "special advocate" in any case that "presents a
novel or significant interpretation of the law," though some
commentators object that this mandate doesn't go far enough.1o7
10150 U.S.C. § 18o5(a) (2012).
102 LOWENTHAL, supra note 25, at 146.
103 FISA Improvements Act, S.1631, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013).
104 USA FREEDOM Act, S.1599, 113th Cong. § 401 (2013).
105 PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 32, at 36, 203-05.
1o6 See Scott Wilson & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama Announces Proposals to Reform NSA
Surveillance, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/polities/obama-to-announce-proposals-to-reform-nsa-
surveillance/2013/o8/o9/ee3d6762 -ona- e3- 9711-37o831of6f4d-story.html.
107 See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, The USA FREEDOMAct and a FISA "Special Advocate",
LAWFARE BLOG (May 20, 2014, 4:19 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.Com/2014/05/the-usa-
freedom- act-and- a-fisa-special-advocate/.
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This is not to suggest that the process for approving surveillance
has been entirely lacking in adversarialism. Adversarial review has
been present, it just has taken place in the executive branch rather
than the FISA court. Surveillance applications typically undergo
multiple layers of internal review before presentation to the court, and
that process can be exacting. The unit that manages the review
process-the Justice Department's Office of Intelligence-routinely
pushes back on operators seeking permission to engage in
surveillance.1os The office might insist that the application include
more facts to support the claim that a target is a spy or terrorist. Or it
might demand a fuller explanation of the expected national security
gains. Or it might require stricter privacy rules governing how
collected information is to be used. Again, self-interest explains
why.109 Attorneys from the Office of Intelligence want to maintain
their enviable record before the FISA court, and the credibility on
which that record depends, so they closely scrutinize the proposals
that land on their desks. If they seem unlikely to meet the court's
approval, they are sent back for revision or rejected outright. This kind
of internal review is not a perfect substitute for a traditional
adversarial hearing before a court, but it can achieve some of the same
benefits.
Nor is this to suggest that all FISA court proceedings should
contain an adversarial element. The bulk of the court's work is
reviewing individualized applications to monitor specific targets, and
the benefits of an adversarial process would be relatively slight in this
context. This is familiar terrain for federal judges, who routinely
approve individualized wiretaps ex parte in regular criminal
investigations. o11 Moreover, cutting-edge legal and policy issues are
less likely to arise in the course of adjudicating a request to tap a
specific person, as these proceedings usually turn on an essentially
factual question-i.e., is there probable cause to believe the target is
an agent of a foreign power? Adversarial proceedings would be more
helpful where the court is asked to approve broad, overarching
surveillance programs like the metadata and PRISM initiatives. These
proceedings frequently will involve the balancing of basic values like
the need to preserve both national security and privacy and civil
liberties. In that respect the proceedings can be quasi-legislative and
thus would benefit from the presence of diverse viewpoints.
108 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 69, at 54-55.
log Sales, Self-Restraint, supra note 63 at 285-86.
11o 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2012).
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Finally, officials should reconsider whether section 215 is the
appropriate statutory vehicle for the government's exploitation of
telephony metadata. It seems a stretch to use the equivalent of a grand
jury subpoena to collect billions of call records. Moreover, some
observers have questioned whether the program is consistent with the
underlying statute.111 Are electronic records (or databases of electronic
records) "tangible things" within the meaning of section 215? Is an
entire database deemed "relevant" because it contains a handful of
records pertinent to counterterrorism efforts? The NSA may well have
good reasons to analyze large troves of telephony metadata, but
section 215 seems like an awkward way to do it. Congress should enact
new legislation that specifically authorizes the program and describes
the limits under which it may operate. In fact, Congress is on the verge
of making substantial changes to the metadata program as this article
goes to press. The legislation would effectively transform it from a
programmatic surveillance initiative that involves bulk collection to a
more familiar individualized surveillance tool that only allows the
NSA to obtain call records from phone companies if the FISA court
concludes that they are associated with a "specific selection term"
(such as an individual phone number).112
Big data is probably here to stay. Programmatic surveillance that
aims at identifying previously unknown terrorists and spies has the
potential to be an important addition to the national security toolkit.
And in an era where private companies like Amazon and Google
assemble detailed digital dossiers to predict their customers' buying
habits, it is more or less inevitable that counterterrorism officials will
want to take advantage of the same sorts of technologies to stop the
next 9/11. That's why it's critical to establish a set of baseline rules to
govern any system of programmatic surveillance. These first
principles can ensure that the government is equipped with a valuable
tool for preventing terrorist atrocities while simultaneously preserving
our national commitment to civil liberties and privacy.
112 See Savage, Surveillance Bill, supra note 13.
"'I See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 5, at 603; Jaffer, supra note 4, at 88-9o.
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